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Abstract—In this paper, a transmit antenna selection (TAS)-
based incremental hybrid decode-amplify-forward (IHDAF)
scheme is proposed to enhance physical layer security in co-
operative relay networks. Specifically, TAS is adopted at the
source in order to reduce the feedback overhead. In the proposed
TAS-based IHDAF scheme, the network transmits signals to the
destination adaptive select direction transmission mode, AF mode
or DF mode depending on the capacity of the source-relay link
and source-relay link. In order to fully examine the benefits
of the proposed TAS-based IHDAF scheme, we first derive its
secrecy outage probability (SOP) in a closed-form expression. We
then conduct asymptotic analysis on the SOP, which reveals the
secrecy performance floor of the proposed TAS-based IHDAF
scheme when no channel state information is available at the
source. Theoretical analysis and simulation results demonstrate
that the proposed TAS-based IHDAF scheme outperforms the
selective decode-and-forward (SDF), the incremental decode-
and-forward (IDF), and the noncooperative direction transmis-
sion (DT) schemes in terms of the SOP and effective secrecy
throughout, especially when the relay is close to the destination.
Furthermore, the proposed TAS-based IHDAF scheme offer a
good trade-off between complexity and performance compare
with using all antennas at the source.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, cooperative communi-
cations, transmit antenna selection, secrecy outage probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENTLY, physical layer security [1–4] as a comple-mentary and alternative cryptographic method to defend
against eavesdroppers from information-theoretic perspective
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has drawn numerous research interests. Physical layer security
offers two major advantages relative to the traditional crypto-
graphic method. First, physical layer security is not condi-
tional on the limited computational ability of eavesdroppers,
which indicates that the achieved level of secrecy will not be
compromised even in the presence of an eavesdropper with
unlimited computational capabilities. Second, physical layer
security techniques can be used to provide direct secure data
transmission, which implies that physical layer security has
a high scalability for the decentralized nature of the network
[2]. In addition, we note that physical layer security is com-
plementary to the traditional cryptographic techniques (e.g., it
can be used to facilitate the distribution of cryptographic keys).
To improve the physical-layer security of wireless communi-
cations, multiple-input multiple-out (MIMO) architectures [1,
5–9] and cooperative relays [3, 10–15] have been investigated
in the context of physical layer security. For example, when
the channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper is
known to the transmitter, the secrecy capacity achieved by
beamforming was examined for multiple-input single-output
(MISO) wiretap channels [1] and MIMO wiretap channels
[8] by considering multiple eavesdroppers. When the CSI of
the eavesdropper is unknown to the transmitter, beamforming
with artificial noise is desirable in MISO or MIMO wiretap
channels due to its robustness [5, 9]. As shown in the literature,
such beamforming techniques can effectively improve the
secrecy performance of wiretap channels [5, 9]. However, these
beamforming methods require precise CSI of the main chan-
nel, which incurs high feedback overhead and computational
cost of signal processing. Moreover, the front-end and the
radio frequency (RF) modules of a multi-antenna transmitter
have a complex hardware structure, which are expensive to
implement. To avoid the high feedback overhead and complex
hardware structure, transmit antenna selection (TAS) has been
applied at the multi-antenna transmitter to enhance physical
layer security [6]. TAS offers the following benefits relative
to beamforming in the context of physical layer security.
First, it requires less feedback overhead and a single RF
chain, which leads to the fact that the feedback overhead
and the computational complexity of TAS is much lower
than that of beamforming. Second, the index of the selected
transmit antenna, which is returned from the destination to
the transmitter over the feedback channel, is meaningless to
the eavesdropper which cannot be exploited to improve her
eavesdropping capability [7].
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Apart from the aforementioned studies, which have exam-
ined physical layer security of point-to-point MIMO systems,
the physical layer security of relay-aided networks has also
drawn increasing attention [3, 10–15]. This is due to the fact
that wireless relaying has been recognized as an effective
means to improve the coverage and reliability of mobile net-
works. In this context, the secrecy performance of cooperative
transmissions, such as decode-and-forward (DF) [10, 11, 16]
and amplify-and-forward (AF) [12, 13, 15, 17], has been exam-
ined in the literature. The secrecy performance of DF relay
selection scheme was examined by considering different com-
bining techniques and different CSI assumptions in [15] and
[16] , respectively. Meanwhile, the authors of [17] analyzed
the secrecy performance of dual-hop AF relaying systems by
taking into account the availability of direct link over Rayleigh
fading channels, in which two linear processing schemes (i.e.,
zero-forcing and maximal ratio transmission) at the relay were
proposed to enhance the security of the considered system.
In the AF scheme, the relay simultaneously amplifies the
information and noise, which leads to the propagation of noise
and interference. In the DF scheme, the relay first decodes the
received signals and then retransmits the recovered signals to
the destination, which often imposes a higher signal processing
burden on the relay. Another drawback of DF scheme is that
the relay may forward signals with decoding errors to the
destination. Motivated by the aforementioned benefits of TAS,
the impact of antenna selection at the multi-antenna relay on
the secrecy performance of one-way and two-way cooperative
relaying networks was studied in [13] and [14], respectively.
More recently, in [11], the secrecy outage probabilities
(SOPs) of the selective decode-and-forward (SDF) and the in-
cremental decode-and-forward (IDF) schemes were analysed,
where no CSI is available and TAS is performed at the source.
In the SDF scheme, the relay operates in DF mode regardless
of whether the information from the source can be successfully
decoded at the destination. In the IDF scheme, the relay oper-
ates in DF mode only when the source’s information cannot be
decoded at the destination in the direction transmission (DT)
mode but can be correctly decoded at the relay. As shown in
[18], the IDF and SDF schemes achieve the same performance
without considering physical layer security. Meanwhile, the
analysis in [11] shows that IDF scheme outperforms the SDF
scheme in the context of physical layer security while the
secrecy performance of these two schemes is not desirable
(i.e., their SOPs are very high) when the relay is close to the
destination.
In order to achieve the benefits offered by both the DF and
AF schemes, a new adaptive hybrid relaying scheme (without
considering security), in which the relay switches between
AF and DF modes based on its decoding capability, was
proposed in [19]. In addition, a similar hybrid relaying scheme
for multiple relays was proposed and the performance gain
in terms of achieving a lower symbol error probability was
analyzed in [20]. In order to enhance the information trans-
mission security, the authors of [21] proposed an incremental
hybrid decode-amplify (IHDAF) scheme based on the signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) thresholds at the relay and destination
in a single-antenna communication scenario. In this IHDAF
scheme, the relay operates in the AF mode when neither the
destination nor the relay can decode the information from the
source directly. It is shown in [21] that the IHDAF scheme
significantly outperforms both the SDF and IDF schemes as it
achieves a lower outage probability or bit error rate. However,
the IHDAF scheme has never been utilized to achieve physical
layer security and its secrecy performance relative to the
SDF and IDF schemes has never been studied. The lack
of the secrecy performance study of the hybrid cooperative
transmissions in the literature and how to further improve
the secrecy performance of SDF and IDF schemes when the
relay is close to the destination motivate this work. Our main
contributions are summarized as follows:
 In the present work, for the first time, we propose a
TAS-based IHDAF scheme to enhance physical layer
security in cooperative relay networks. In this scheme the
source transmits signals directly to the destination when
such signals can be successfully decoded and the relay
keeps silent. Otherwise, the source transmits signals to
the destination with the aid of a relay, which operates in
either DF or AF mode, depending whether or not the relay
can decode the source’s signals. In addition, an efficient
TAS scheme is adopted at the source, aiming to avoid
high feedback overhead, high hardware complexity, and
complicated cooperations.
 In order to fully examine the secrecy performance of
the proposed scheme, we first derive a closed-form ex-
pression for its SOP. For the sake of comparison, we
also examine the secrecy performance of the tradition-
al IDF, SDF, and DT schemes in our considered sys-
tem model (multi-antenna communication scenario with
TAS scheme). Our examination shows that the proposed
scheme significantly outperforms the (TAS-based) IDF,
SDF, and DT schemes in terms of achieving a lower
SOP, especially when the relay is close to the destination.
We also conduct asymptotic analysis on the SOP of the
proposed scheme with the SDF and IDF schemes as
benchmarks. This asymptotic analysis discloses the SOP
floor of the proposed scheme that is lower than or equal
to that of the SDF and IDF schemes, which analytically
confirms the advantages of our proposed scheme.
 We also examine the effective secrecy throughput (EST)
of the proposed scheme by incorporating the different
time slots incurred in the direct and cooperative transmis-
sions. Our examination reveals that the proposed scheme
achieves a higher EST relative to other schemes. In order
to study the efficiency of the proposed scheme in terms of
the feedback overhead, we compare it with a codebook-
based beamforming (CB) scheme. Surprisingly, our study
indicates that our proposed scheme can outperform the
CB scheme with less feedback overhead and fewer RF
chains.
Notation: Scalar variables are denoted by italic symbols;
Vectors and matrices are denoted by lower-case and upper-
case boldface symbols, respectively; X  CN(; 2) denotes
a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable X
with mean  and covariance 2; Pr[] is the probability; fX()
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and FX() represent the probability density function (PDF) and
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the random variable
X , respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND TAS-BASED IHDAF SCHEME
A. System Model
In this work, we consider a half-duplex relay network
as illustrated in Fig. 1, in which an NS-antenna source (S)
communicates with an ND-antenna destination (D) with the
aid of a single-antenna relay (R) in the presence of an NE-
antenna eavesdropper (E). We clarify that the communication
between S and D can be conducted via both the direct link
and relay link. In this network, we assume that only the
receiver knows the CSI of corresponding channels (i.e., R
knows the CSI of the S-R link, D knows the CSI of the R-
D and S-D links, and E knows the CSI of the S-E and R-E
links). We also assume that the feedback capability of each
legitimate link (i.e., S-D, R-D, and S-R) is limited and the
receiver cannot feed back the full CSI of each link to the
corresponding transmitter (i.e., the transmitter does not know
the CSI of each link). Furthermore, we consider a passive
eavesdropping scenario, in which E does not feed back the
CSI of the S-E and R-E links and thus such CSI is unknown
to other nodes. Meanwhile, in this work we consider a multi-
antenna E, who applies maximal radio combining (MRC) to
maximize the probability of the successful eavesdropping.1
We note that multiple antennas may not be available at the
relay in this system due to the constraints by the hardware
size or implementing cost. Therefore, this system is gen-
erally applicable to many practical wireless communication
scenarios. For example, in the emerging Internet of Things
the far departed nodes may exchange information with the aid
of a single-antenna relay [22]. In addition, this system can
be found in device-to-device (D2D) communication scenarios
where a single-antenna relay assists two multi-antenna devices
to communication with each other [11, 21–25]. Furthermore,
we consider the similar scenario adopted in [4, 11, 16, 17, 26],
where both the direct links S-D and S-E are assumed to be
existent, and E can intercept the data from both the S and R.
We denote H2CNDNS as the channel matrix between S
and D, and G2CNENS as the channel matrix between S and
E. The entries of H and G are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaussian random variables with
zero mean and unit variance. In this network, we adopt the
TAS scheme at S, in which the antenna that maximizes the
instantaneous SNR of the S-D link is selected as active [6].
As such, the index of the selected antenna, n is determined
1It is noted that, in this work we consider a multi-antenna E, who knows
the CSI of the S-E and R-E links, and then applies MRC to maximize the
probability of the successful eavesdropping. As such, this multi-antenna E
can also be interpreted as multiple colluding Es that cooperatively decode
the desired information. Therefore, the operation of the proposed scheme
does not change in order to address physical layer security in the colluding
eavesdropping scenario.
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Fig. 1. The illustration of a half-duplex cooperative relay network in the
presence of an NE -antenna eavesdropper.
by2
n = arg max
1nNS
kh(n)k; (1)
where h(n) denotes the nth column ofH. We highlight that the
strongest antenna selected by the TAS scheme is equivalent to
a random source antenna for E, since this antenna is solely
determined by H, which is uncorrelated with G. Thus, E
cannot exploit any diversity benefits from multiple source
antennas [11]. Furthermore, using TAS method at the multi-
antenna transmitter can enhance security and reduce hardware
complexity [7]. Also, we assume that MRC is adopted at D
to maximize the quality of the received signal.
B. TAS-based IHDAF Scheme for Physical Layer Security
The operation of the TAS-based IHDAF scheme in the
considered network is shown in Fig. 2 [21]. With this scheme,
the network operates in two phases, namely, the broadcast
phase and the cooperative phase. In the broadcast phase, as
represented by the solid lines in Fig. 1, if the capacity of the
S-D link exceeds the codeword rate Rc, the network adopts
DT mode and R keeps silent. Otherwise, the network operates
in the cooperative phase (i.e., as represented by the dash lines
in Fig. 1) and R helps the transmission from S to D. Differing
from the conventional IDF scheme, R operates in either the
DF mode or the AF mode, according to the capacity of the
S-R link. Specifically, if the capacity of the S-R link, CSR,
exceeds the codeword rate Rc, R operates in the DF mode and
thus, decodes the received signal and retransmits it towards D.
Otherwise, R operates in the AF mode to amplify and forward
the received signal to D.
In the considered network, the TAS-based IHDAF scheme
can be interpreted as follows: S is equipped with NS antennas
and employs a TAS scheme, in which D selects the strongest
antenna (among the NS available antennas) which maximizes
the instantaneous SNR of S-D link, and then informs the index
of the strongest antenna through an open error-free feedback
2Here, D selects the “strongest” antenna (among the NS available antennas
at S) which maximizes the instantaneous SNR of S-D link, and then informs
the index of the strongest antenna through an open error-free feedback channel
to S.
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Fig. 2. Signal processing diagram of the TAS-based IHDAF scheme in
cooperative relay networks
channel to S. Then D decides whether it can decode the
information sent from S according to the instantaneous SNR
of the S-D link. If yes, D informs R to keep silent and S to
adopt the DT mode. Otherwise, D informs R to be active and
R to choose either the DF mode or the AF mode, according
to the capacity of the S-R link.
We now formulate the broadcast phase and the cooperation
phase of the TAS-based IHDAF scheme in the presence of
eavesdropping as follows:
1) Broadcast phase: When the coded confidential informa-
tion x is sent by S, the signal received at R, D, and E are
given by
ySR =
p
kSRP hSR x+ nR; (2)
ySD =
p
kSDP h x+ nD; (3)
and
ySE =
p
kSEP g x+ nE; (4)
respectively, where hSR denotes the channel coefficient from
the selected transmit antenna of S to R, i.e., hSR , hSR(n), h
is an ND1 vector representing the channel coefficients from
the selected transmit antenna of S to D, i.e., h , H(:; n), and
g is an NE  1 vector representing the channel coefficients
from the selected transmit antenna of S to E, i.e., g , G(:
; n). In (2)–(4), P is the transmit power of S, and we denote
kmn = K

d0
dmn
v
as the path-loss between nodes m and n,
dmn is the distance between the m and n, where m 2 fS, Rg,
n 2 fR,D, Eg, and m 6= n [27], d0 is a reference distance, v
is the path loss exponent, and K =


4d0
2
is the free-space
path loss at d0, where  is the wavelength. We also denote
nR, nD and nE as the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
at R, D, and E, respectively. We assume that nR  CN(0; 2R),
nD  CN(0; 2DIND), and nE  CN(0; 2EINE).
We assume that E adopts MRC to combine her received
signals from different antennas. Based on (2), (3), and (4), the
instantaneous SNRs of the S-R, S-D, and S-E links are given
by
SR = jhSRj2
SR = jhSRj2 kSRP
2R
; (5)
~SD = jjhjj2
SD = jjhjj2 kSDP
2D
; (6)
and
SE = jjgjj2
SE = jjgjj2 kSEP
2E
; (7)
respectively, where 
mn is the average SNR of the m   n
link. Then, the channel capacity between m and n is written
as
Cmn = log2(1 + mn): (8)
Given the target information transmit rate as Rc in bits per
channel use (bpcu), transmission outage occurs when Cmn
falls below Rc [11, 28].
2) Cooperation phase: We note that R operates in either the
DF mode or the AF mode in the TAS-based IHDAF Scheme.
According to Shannon’s channel theorem, R can successfully
decode x with an ignorable error probability when CSR > Rc
(i.e., when R operates in the DF mode) [3]. As such, when R
operates in the DF mode, the signals received at D and E are
written as
yRD =
p
kRDP hRD x+ nRD; (9)
yRE =
p
kREP gRE x+ nRE; (10)
where hRD 2 CND1 and gRE 2 CNE1 represent the channel
coefficient vector from R to D and that from R to E, respec-
tively. The entries of hRD and gRE are i.i.d. complex Gaussian
random variables with zero mean and unit variance. When R
operates in the AF mode, the signals received at D and E can
be written as
yRD =  hRD ySR + nRD; (11)
yRE = 
p
kREP hRE ySR + nRE; (12)
where the amplification coefficients  and  are given by
=
p
kRDPp
kRDP jhSRj2+2R
and =
p
kREPp
kREP jhSRj2+2R
, respectively [29].
Then, the instantaneous SNRs of the R-D and R-E links
are given by RD = jjhRDjj2 
RD and RE = jjhRDjj2 
RE,
respectively, where 
RD = kRDP2D and 
RE =
kREP
2E
denote the
average SNR of the R-D and that of R-E links, respectively. In
the cooperation phase, D combines the signals from both the
direct link and R link using MRC. This leads to the capacity
at D in the DF mode and in the AF mode as [11, 21]
CDFSRD = log2(1 + 
DF
SRD) = log2(1 + ~SD + RD); (13)
CAFSRD=log2
 
1+AFSRD

=log2
 
1+~SD+
SRRD
SR+RD+1

; (14)
where DFSRD and 
AF
SRD represent the instantaneous SNRs at D
for the DF mode and AF mode, respectively. Similarly, the
capacities at E in the DF mode and in the AF mode are given
by
CDFSRE = log2(1 + 
DF
SRE) = log2(1 + SE + RE); (15)
CAFSRE=log2
 
1+AFSRE

=log2
 
1+SE+
SRRE
SR+RE+1

; (16)
where DFSRE and 
AF
SRE represent the instantaneous SNRs at E
for the DF and AF modes, respectively.
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C. Performance Metric
In [1, 30], the notion of SOP was introduced in the quasi-
static Rayleigh fading wiretap channel. If the CSI of the
legitimate link is assumed to be perfectly known by S, the
overall codeword rate Rc can be dynamically chosen as
Rc = Cb, where Cb is the instantaneous capacity of the
legitimate link. We note that perfect secrecy cannot be always
guaranteed in the passive eavesdropping scenario since there
exists a possibility that some messages transmitted by S are
leaked to E, and for this reason we define a secrecy rate
Rs, which is usually fixed. The difference between Rc and
Rs, i.e., Re = Rc   Rs, is the redundant rate that provides
secrecy against eavesdropping. The SOP is thus defined as
PrfCb   Rs < Ceg, where Ce is the instantaneous capacity
of E’s channel [11]. Note that the transmission outage does
not occur when the value of Rc is chosen to be equal to Cb.
However, we now study a special case where S does not know
the CSI about both D and E. In this scenario, since Cb is not
known, to study the secrecy performance, we must choose a
fixed overall codeword rate Rc and a fixed rate redundancy
Re, yielding a fixed secure rate Rs = Rc   Re. Therefore,
the SOP is the union of two events, i.e., Cb falls below Rc or
Re falls below Ce, which is expressed as [11]
Pso = Prf(Cb < Rc) [ (Ce > Re)g; (17)
where Pr (Cb < Rc) , Pb denotes the probability of the
reliability outage event, and Pr (Ce < Re) , Pe refers to the
secrecy outage event [11].
III. EXACT SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
OF TAS-BASED IHDAF SCHEME
In this section, we present a comprehensive analysis on the
SOP for cooperative relay networks with perfect and outdated
CSI.
A. Preliminaries
In practical systems, the TAS phase may exceed the co-
herent time of the channel. As a result, the main channel
may have already changed since the moment when S receives
the feedback of the optimal antenna index due to the time-
varying nature of the wireless channel. In this case, the
optimal antenna is selected based on the outdated CSI. Let
h(t  ) denote the  time-delayed version of current CSI
(i.e., h(t)). The relationship between h(t ) and h(t) can
be modeled as h(t) =
p
h(t   ) + p1  e(t) [31, 32],
where e(t)  CN(0; IND ) denotes the channel error vector
and  = [J0(2ft)]2 is the correction coefficient between
h(t ) and h(t), with f as the maximum Doppler frequency
and J0() as the zeroth-order Bessel function of the first kind
[33, Eq. (8.411)].
We denote ~X = ~SD = jjh(t)jj2
SD and X = SD =
jjh(t )jj2
SD as the current SNR and the time-delayed SNR,
respectively. The PDF of the ~SD is given by [34]
f ~X(~x) =
Z 1
0
f ~XjX(~xjx)fX(x)dx; (18)
where f eXjX() denotes the PDF of ~SD conditioned on SD,
given by [35]
f eXjX(~xjx) = 1(1  )
SD

~x
x
ND 1
2
e
  x+~x
(1 )
SD
 IND 1

2
p
x~x
(1  )
SD

; (19)
and In() is the n th modified Bessel function of the first
kind [33, Eq. (8.406.1)]. The PDF of X is given by [31]
fX(x) =
NS
(ND   1)!
NS 1X
i=0
( 1)i

NS   1
i

e
  (i+1)x
SD

i(ND 1)X
j=0
jix
j+ND 1

j+NDSD
; (20)
where ji =
Pb
x=a
j(i 1)
(j x)! , with a = maxf0; j   (ND   1)g,
b = minfj; (i   1)(ND   1)g, j0 = 0i = 1, j1 = 1j! ,
and 1i = i. Substituting (20) and (19) into (18), we can
respectively obtain the PDF and CDF of ~X as
f eX(~x) = NS(ND   1)!
NS 1X
i=0
i(ND 1)X
j=0
jX
k=0
 (i; j; k;
SD)
 ~xk+ND 1e 
(i+1)~x
(i(1 )+1)
SD ; (21)
and
F eX(~x) = NS(ND   1)!
NS 1X
i=0
i(ND 1)X
j=0
jX
k=0
 (i; j; k;
SD)

 1

k +ND;
(i+1)~x
(i(1 )+1)
SD


(i+1)
(i(1 )+1)
SD
k+ND ; (22)
with
 (i; j; k;
SD)
=

NS 1
i

j
k

(j +ND 1)!
(k +ND 1)!
( 1)ijik(1  )j k
(i(1 )+1)j+k+ND
k+NDSD
;
(23)
where  1(; x) =
R x
0
e tt 1dt is the lower incomplete
Gamma function [33, Eq. (8.350.1)].
In the case of  = 1, which corresponds to the case with
 = 0, i.e., perfect feedback without delay, (21) is identical to
(20) and (22) is identical to F eX(~x)j=1 = 1  (ND; ~x
SD ) (ND) NS .
B. Secrecy Outage Probability Analysis for Outdated CSI
In this section, we analyze the SOP of the proposed TAS-
based IHDAF scheme. As shown in Fig. 2, in the cooperative
phase of the proposed TAS-based IHDAF scheme, R adaptive-
ly selects AF mode or DF mode due to the incremental nature
of the proposed scheme (which is different from the SDF
and IDF schemes). As such, to derive the overall SOP of the
proposed TAS-based IHDAF scheme, we have to consider the
following three mutually exclusive events. i) The information
transmitted from S is successfully decoded by D in the DT
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mode, where R keeps silent. ii) S’s transmission failed at D in
the DT mode, but R decoded it correctly and operates in DF
mode to retransmit it to D. iii) Neither D nor R can decode the
information from S correctly i.e., the capacities of both the S-
R link and the S-D link are lower than Rc, and then R operates
in the AF mode to amplify and forward the information to D.
As per the rules of the proposed TAS-based IHDAF scheme
(as shown in Fig. 2), the probability that S operates in the DT
mode is PrfCSDRcg, the probability that R operates in the
DF mode is PrfCSRRcgPrfCSD<Rcg, and the probability
that R operates in the AF mode is PrfCSR<RcgPrfCSD<Rcg.
Then, the SOPs of the three mutually exclusive events are
given by
PDTout = Prf(CSD < Rc) [ (CSE  Re)j(CSD  Rc)g
 PrfCSD  Rcg; (24)
PDFout = Prf(CDFSRD<Rc) [ (CDFSRERe)j(CSD<Rc; CSRRc)g
 PrfCSD<Rc; CSRRcg; (25)
and
PAFout = Prf(CAFSRD<Rc) [ (CAFSRERe)j(CSD<Rc; CSR<Rc)g
 PrfCSD<Rc; CSR<Rcg; (26)
respectively. Therefore, we can express the SOP of the TAS-
based IHDAF scheme as
PIHDAF = P
DT
out + P
DF
out + P
AF
out: (27)
In the following, we sequentially derive the expressions
for PDTout, P
DF
out, and P
AF
out in Theorem 1, Theorem 2, and
Theorem 3, respectively.
Theorem 1: The SOP in the first sub-case (i.e., the SOP
of DT mode without considering the cooperation transmission
mode of R) is given by
PDTout =
 (NE;
Te

SE
)
 (NE)

1 
NS 1X
i=0
i(ND 1)X
j=0
jX
k=0
NS(i; j; k;
SD)
(ND   1)!

 1

k+ND;
(i+1)T
(i(1 )+1)
SD


(i+1)
(i(1 )+1)
SD
k+ND

;
(28)
where T = 2Rc   1 and Te = 2Re   1, and  (; x) =R +1
x
e tt 1dt is the upper incomplete gamma function [33,
Eq. (8.350.2)], and  (y) =
R +1
0
e tty 1dt is the gamma
function [33, Eq. (8.310.1)].
Proof: Following (24), we have
PDTout
= Prf(CSD<Rc)[(CSERe)j(CSDRc)gPrfCSDRcg
= PrfCSE  Rej(CSD  Rc)gPrfCSD  Rcg
= PrfCSE  Reg (1  PrfCSD < Rcg) ; (29)
where we have applied the fact that Prf(CSD < Rc)j(CSD 
Rc)g = 0 and CSE  Re is independent of CSD  Rc.
According to the discussion in Section-II, from E’s point of
view, the optimum TAS scheme for D will be a random TAS
for E, as the main channel and E’ channel are uncorrelated.
Then, based on (7), we can obtain the CDFs of SE [29]. (i.e.,
FSE(x) =

1   (NE ;
x

SE
)
 (NE)

). As such, we can achieve
PrfCSEReg=Prflog2(1+SE)Reg=
 (NE;
Te

SE
)
 (NE)
: (30)
In additional, based on (6) and (22), we can achieve
PrfCSD < Rcg =Prflog2(1 + ~SD) < Rcg
=
NS 1X
i=0
i(ND 1)X
j=0
jX
k=0
NS(i; j; k;
SD)
(ND   1)!

 1

k +ND;
(i+1)T
(i(1 )+1)
SD


(i+1)
(i(1 )+1)
SD
k+ND : (31)
Substituting (30) and (31) into (29), we achieve the desired
result in (28).
Remark 1: In the case of single receive antenna and TAS
based on perfect feedback, i.e., ND = 1 and  = 1, we can
obtain the corresponding SOP from (28) as
PDTout =
 (NE;
Te

SE
)
 (NE)

1 

1  e  T
SD
NS
; (32)
which is a generalization of [11, Eq. (33)]. In other words, [11,
Eq. (33)] can be regarded as a special cases of Theorem 1 in
(28).
Theorem 2: The SOP for the DF relaying cooperative
transmission mode is given by (33), as shown at the top of
the next page.
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix A.
Remark 2: In the case of single receive antenna and
TAS based on perfect feedback, i.e., ND = 1 and  = 1,
we can obtain the corresponding SOP by (25), which is a
generalization of [11, Eq. (35)]. In other words, [11, Eq. (35)]
can be regarded as a special cases of Theorem 2.
As neither D nor R received the message from S correctly,
instead of remaining silent during the cooperation phase in
the IDF scheme [11], the proposed TAS-based IHDAF scheme
will employ AF relaying cooperation to improve the system
secrecy performance. In this case, the SOP of the third sub-
case can be given by
PAFout =Prf(CAFSRD<Rc) [ (CAFSRE>Re)j(CSD<Rc; CSR<Rc)g
 PrfCSD < Rc; CSR < Rcg; (39)
where CAFSRD and C
AF
SRD are, respectively, the capacity at D and
that at E when R employs the AF relaying cooperation. We
present our new result concerning the SOP in the following
theorem (See Appendix B for its proof).
Theorem 3: The SOP for the AF relaying cooperative
transmission mode is given by
PAFout = (P
AF1
out +P
AF2
out  PAF1out PAF2out ) PrfCSD < Rc; CSR < Rcg;
(40)
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PDFout =
h
PrfCDFSRD<Rcg+PrfCDFSRERegPrfCSD<Rcg   PrfCDFSRERegPrfCDFSRD<Rcg
i
PrfCSR  Rcg; (33)
where
PrfCDFSRD < Rcg = F~SD(T ) 
ND 1X
n=0
1

n;
1

RD

; (34)
and
PrfCDFSRE  Reg =
 (NE;
Te

SE
)
 (NE)
+
NE 1X
n=0
2

n;
1

RE

; (35)
with
1

n;
1

RD

=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
PNS 1
i=0
Pi(ND 1)
j=0
Pj
k=0
Pn
n1=0
 
n
n1

( 1)n1 (i; j; k;
SD) NSe
  T

RD
 (ND)
nRDn!
 T
n n1 1

k+ND+n1;(
i+1
(i(1 )+1)
SD 
1

RD
)T


i+1
(i(1 )+1)
SD 
1

RD
k+ND+n1 ; if i+1(i(1 )+1)
SD 6= 1
RDPNS 1
i=0
Pi(ND 1)
j=0
Pj
k=0
Pn
n1=0
 
n
n1

( 1)n1 (i; j; k;
SD) NSe
  T

RD
 (ND)
nRDn!
Tn+k+ND
n+k+ND
; if i+1(i(1 )+1)
SD =
1

RD
(36)
2

n;
1

RE

=
8>><>>:
e
  Te

RE
 (NE)

NE
SE 
RE
nn!
Pn
k=0
 
n
k

( 1)kTn ke
 1

NE+k;

1

SE
  1
RE

Te


1

SE
  1
RE
NE+k ; if 1
SE 6= 1
RE
e
  Te

RE
 (NE)

NE
SE 
RE
nn!
Pn
k=0
 
n
k

( 1)k TNE+neNE+k ; if 1
SE = 1
RE
(37)
and
F~SD(T ) =
NS 1X
i=0
i(ND 1)X
j=0
jX
k=0
NS (i; j; k;
SD) 1

k +ND;
(i+1)T
(i(1 )+1)
SD

(ND   1)!

(i+1)
(i(1 )+1)
SD
k+ND : (38)
where
PAF1out =
1
1  e  T
SR
+
e
  T
SR
PND 1
n=0 1

n; 1
RD

  3
1  e  T
SR

F~SD(T )
;
(41)
and
PAF2out =
2

 (NE;
Te

SE
)
 (NE)
  1

+

1  e  T
SR  (NE;
Te

SE
)
 (NE)

1  e  T
SR
+
4   e 
T

SR
PNE 1
n=0 2

n; 1
RE

1  e  T
SR
; (42)
with
1=
ND 1X
m=0
1

SR
( 1
RD )
m
( 1
SR +
1

RD
)m+1
+
( 1
RD )
ND
( 1
SR +
1

RD
)ND
 e  T
SR ; (43)
2 =
NE 1X
m=0
1

SR
( 1
RE )
m
( 1
SR +
1

RE
)m+1
+
( 1
RE )
NE
( 1
SR +
1

RE
)NE
; (44)
3 =
"
ND 1X
m=0
mX
n=0
1

SR
( 1
RD )
m
( 1
SR +
1

RD
)m+1
+
ND 1X
n=0
( 1
RD )
ND
( 1
SR +
1

RD
)ND
#
1

n;
1

RD
+
1

SR

; (45)
and
4 =
"
NE 1X
m=0
mX
n=0
1

SR
( 1
RE )
m
( 1
SR +
1

RE
)m+1
+
NE 1X
n=0
( 1
RE )
NE
( 1
SR +
1

RE
)NE
#
2

n;
1

RE
+
1

SR

: (46)
Finally, substituting (28), (33), and (40) into (27), the SOP
of the proposed TAS-based IHDAF scheme can be achieved
as in (47), as shown at the top of the next page.
Remark 3: Following a similar procedure to derive the SOP
of the proposed TAS-based IHDAF scheme, we can obtain
the SOPs of the IDF and SDF schemes as benchmarks to
demonstrate the secrecy performance of our proposed TAS-
based IHDAF scheme. A thorough comparison among these
three schemes is provided in Section V.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY AND
EFFECTIVE SECRECY THROUGHPUT OF TAS-BASED
IHDAF SCHEME
In this section, we first analytically determine the asymptotic
SOP of the proposed TAS-based IHDAF scheme with the
SDF and IDF schemes as benchmarks, aiming to theoretically
reveal the benefits of the proposed scheme. In addition, we
adopt a new performance metric EST (i.e., effective secre-
cy throughput) to examine the secrecy performance of the
cooperative and DT schemes by taking into account the
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PIHDAF =
 (NE;
Te

SE
)
 
1  F~SD(T )

 (NE)
+ e
  T
SR

F~SD(T ) +
ND 1X
n=0
1
 
n;
1

RD
 (NE; Te
SE )
 (NE)
+
NE 1X
n=0
2
 
n;
1

RE
 1
  F~SD(T )

1   (NE;
Te

SE
)
 (NE)

2  

1  e
  T
SR  (NE; Te
SE )
 (NE)

+ e
  T
SR
NE 1X
n=0
2
 
n;
1

RE
  4+ 1
1  e  T
SR


F~SD(T )1+e
  T
SR
ND 1X
n=0
1
 
n;
1

RD
 31  (NE; Te
SE )
 (NE)

2 e
T

SR

+e
  T
SR
NE 1X
n=0
2
 
n;
1

RE
 4: (47)
different time slots required by these schemes. Furthermore,
we examine the tradeoff between the secrecy performance and
required feedback overhead in the considered system model by
comparing our proposed scheme with the CB (i.e., codebook-
based beamforming) scheme. Finally, we discuss the impact of
outdated CSI and the optimal antenna selection on the secrecy
performance of the proposed scheme.
A. Asymptotic Secrecy Outage Probability
In this subsection, we examine the asymptotic SOP of the
proposed TAS-based IHDAF scheme with the SDF and IDF
schemes as benchmarks to obtain further insights.
Corollary 1: In the case of P=2E ! 0, we have
lim
P
2E
!0
PIHDAF < lim
P
2E
!0
PIDF = lim
P
2E
!0
PSDF: (48)
Proof: When P=2E ! 0, following (29), (33), and (39),
we obtain the SOP of the proposed TAS-based IHDAF scheme
as
lim
P
2E
!0
PIHDAF =PrfCDFSRD < RcgPrfCSR > Rcg
+ Prf(CAFSRD < Rc)j(CSD < Rc; CSR < Rc)g
 PrfCSD < Rc; CSR < Rcg: (49)
Likewise, according to [18] and following (29) and (33), we
obtain the SOP of the proposed TAS-based SDF and IDF
schemes for P=2E ! 0 as
lim
P
2E
!0
PIDF = lim
P
2E
!0
PSDF
=PrfCDFSRD < RcgPrfCSR > Rcg
+ Prf(CSD < Rc)j(CSD < Rc; CSR < Rc)g
 PrfCSD < Rc; CSR < Rcg: (50)
We note that the only difference between (49) and (50) is
that CAFSRD in (49) is replaced by CSD in (50). We recall that
CAFSRD > CSD due to C
AF
SRD = log2
 
1 + ~SD +
~SDRD
~SD+RD+1

and
CSD = log2
 
1+ ~SD

. As such, we achieve the desired result
in (48).
Remark 4: Corollary 1 indicates that the proposed TAS-
based IHDAF scheme achieves a lower SOP than the SDF and
IDF schemes when P=2E!0, which analytically discloses the
advantages of the proposed scheme. We note that this conclu-
sion is still valid for reasonable small but non-zero values of
P=2E (e.g., 0 dB), which will be verified in Section V. Based
on Corollary 1, we also conclude that the performance gain of
proposed scheme over SDF and IDF schemes becomes more
prominent as NS increases when NS is relatively small. This is
due to the fact that CAFSRD CSD = log2

1+ ~SDRD(~SD+RD+1)
1
(1+~SD)

increases with NS when  > 0 and the number of antennas at
S is relatively small.
Corollary 2: When P=2D !1, we have
lim
P
2D
!1
PIHDAF = lim
P
2D
!1
PIDF < lim
P
2D
!1
PSDF: (51)
Proof: Following (31), we have
lim
P
2D
!1
PrfCSD<Rcg = lim
P
2D
!1
NS 1X
i=0
i(ND 1)X
j=0
jX
k=0
NS(i; j; k;
SD)
(ND   1)!

 1

k +ND;
(i+1)T
(i(1 )+1)
SD


(i+1)
(i(1 )+1)
SD
k+ND = 0:
(52)
Based on the above equality, the value of (25) and (26) tend
to be zero, and thus we have
lim
P
2D
!1
PIHDAF =
 (NE;
Te

SE
)
 (NE)
: (53)
As per [11, Eq. (42)], we also have
lim
P
2D
!1
PIDF =
 (NE;
Te

SE
)
 (NE)
< lim
P
2D
!1
PSDF: (54)
Comparing (53) with (54), we complete the proof.
Remark 5: Corollary 2 indicates that for P=2D!1 the
proposed TAS-based IHDAF scheme achieves a lower SOP
than the SDF scheme, which is the same as that of the IDF
scheme. This also demonstrates the advantage of the proposed
scheme. In addition, as per (53) we note that the SOP of the
proposed scheme for P=2D!1 does not depend on the SNR
of S-D link.
B. Effective Secrecy Throughput
Following the definition of EST adopted in [11, 36], which
is the product of the secrecy rate and the secure transmission
probability, the EST of the proposed scheme is given by
TIHDAF = Rs(1  P outDT ) (55a)
+
Rs
2
P outDT PrfCSR  Rcg(1  P outDF ) (55b)
+
Rs
2
P outDT PrfCSR < Rcg(1  P outAF ); (55c)
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where P outDT = Prf(CSD < Rc) [ (CSE  Re)g, P outDF =
Prf(CDFSRD < Rc) [ (CDFSRE  Re)g, and P outAF = Prf(CAFSRD <
Rc) [ (CAFSRE  Re)g. We note that only one time slot is
required for the DT mode while two times slots are used
in the AF and DF mode, which is the reason why we have
Rs in (55a) but Rs=2 in (55b) and (55c). Based on (55), we
will numerically examine the EST of the proposed scheme in
Section V.
C. Tradeoff between Secrecy Performance and Feedback
Overhead
In this work, we adopt TAS in the proposed scheme due the
following three aspects.
 In some communication scenario, such as Internet of
Things and Device-to-Device communications, the sys-
tem may only support a few bits feedback overhead due to
limited resources, which leads to that the techniques (e.g.,
beamforming) that require high feedback overhead are not
applicable. Considering such limited feedback overhead,
we adopt TAS in this work since it only requires dlogNSe
bits feedback overhead.
 In the context of physical layer security, TAS can enable
legitimate nodes to achieve a high diversity gain while
does not offer benefits to E (i.e., the eavesdropper). This is
due to the fact that the strongest antenna selected in TAS
is equivalent to a random source antenna for E based on
the valid assumption that legitimate links are independent
of the eavesdropping links.
 A multi-antenna transmitter suffers from a complex hard-
ware structure (e.g., multiple RF chains), which are
expensive to implement. We adopt TAS at the multi-
antenna S in order avoid this complex hardware structure
since TAS only requires one active RF chain.
In practice, if only the feedback overhead is the bottle-
neck of the system, another transmission scheme, namely,
CB(i.e.,codebook-based beamforming) scheme, was proposed
in [31, 37]. In this CB scheme, all transmit antennas at
the source are active and the required feedback overhead is
determined by the number of codebook vectors available to
select. Specifically, in this scheme a pre-designed codebook
of N unit-norm vectors is known to both the transmitter
and receiver. Then, the receiver selects the best codebook
vector (using it as a beamforming vector) that maximizes the
SNR of the channel based on the known CSI and feeds back
the index of the selected vector through an open error-free
feedback channel to the transmitter. As such, the amount of
feedback overhead required by the CB scheme is dlogNe.
Here, we adopt this CB scheme as a benchmark to study the
efficiency of the proposed scheme in terms of the tradeoff
between its achieved secrecy performance and the required
feedback overhead. In order to guarantee a fair comparison
between the proposed scheme and the CB scheme, we also
assume that D selects the best codebook vector based on the
S-D link and feeds back the its index to S. We refer to the
IHDAF scheme with CB (instead of TAS) as the CB-IHDAF
scheme while refer to the TAS-based IHDAF as TAS-IHDAF
when comparing with CB-IHDAF. Particularly, we adopt two
different codebooks in the CB scheme for comparison (i.e.,
N = 4 and N = 16). For N = 4, we adopt the codebook
generated based on the Generalized Lloyd Algorithm (GLA)
(also known as LBG algorithm) presented in [38]. ForN = 16,
we use a Grassmannian codebook proposed in [39]. We further
refer to the CB-IHDAF scheme with N = 4 and N = 16 as
CB(N = 4)-IHDAF and CB(N = 16)-IHDAF, respectively.
We will compare the secrecy performance of the proposed
scheme with that of the CB-IHDAF scheme in Section V to
further demonstrate the advantages of our proposed scheme.
D. Discussion on Optimal Antenna Selection
As mentioned in Section II-A, the antenna selection given
in (1) is not optimal. The optimal antenna selection should
depend on the working mode of the proposed scheme. Specif-
ically, the current selection is optimal when DT mode is active,
the optimal selection should maximize DFSRD (i.e., the SNR at
D for DF mode) when DF mode is active at R, and the optimal
selection should maximize AFSRD (i.e., the SNR at D for AF
mode) when AF mode is active at R. As such, the optimal
selection not only depends on the S-D and S-R links, but
also relates to the R-D link. Therefore, the optimal selection
requires the cooperation between R and D (e.g., R has to
feedback the CSI of the S-R link to D in order to enable
this optimal selection), which costs extra resources (e.g., time
slots, feedback overhead). In order to avoid such cost and to
achieve an efficient scheme of low complexity, we adopt a
sub-optimal selection scheme in the current work. However,
we will examine the performance gap between the adopted
sub-optimal selection and the optimal selection numerically in
Section V.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to examine the
secrecy performance of the proposed scheme. The SDF, IDF,
and DT 3 schemes are also shown for comparison. We show
that the proposed TAS-based IHDAF scheme outperforms
other schemes by achieving a lower SOP and a higher EST,
especially in the scenario where R is close to D. Moreover,
Monte Carlo simulations are also performed to verify the
analytical results given in this paper. In the simulation, we
locate R on a straight line between S and D, which is a typical
topology applied in relay networks. We set the path-loss factor
as  = 4, and that the reference distance for the antenna far-
field as d0 = 1m. All nodes transmit at a carrier frequency of
fc = 2:4GHz, corresponding to a wavelength of  = 125mm,
B = 10MHz, and N0 =  174dBn/Hz [11].
Fig. 3 plots the SOP versus the normalized distance between
S and R (e.g., the value of ) with different values of ND. In
3It is noted that the SOP of the non-cooperative DT scheme is
given by P outDT = Prf(CSD < Rc) [ (CSE > Re)g =
NS
PNS 1
i=0
Pi(ND 1)
j=0
Pj
k=0
(i;j;k;
SD)
(ND 1)!
 1

k+ND;
(i+1)T
(i(1 )+1)
SD


(i+1)
(i(1 )+1)
SD
k+ND
h
1  
 (NE;
Te

SE
)
 (NE)
i
+
 (NE;
Te

SE
)
 (NE)
: Moreover, due to the multiplexing loss of the
cooperative schemes, we also assume that the three cooperative schemes (i.e.,
the IDF, SDF and IHDAF shcemes) transmit with twice of the rate of the
Non-cooperative scheme [11].
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability versus the normalized distance between
S and R (i.e., ) with 
SE = 
RE = 0dB, 
SD = 20 dB, Re = 2 bpcu,
Rc = 3:6 bpcu,  = 1, NS = 2, and NE = 4.
this figure, we first observe that the simulation and analytical
results match well for different values of  and ND, which
confirms the correctness of the derived analytical expression
of the SOP. We also observe that all the SDF, IDF, and IHDAF
schemes outperform the DT scheme in terms of achieving
lower SOPs, illustrating the security benefits of exploiting
cooperative relays to prevent eavesdropping attacks. Fig. 3
shows that the SOPs of all cooperative relaying schemes
decrease as the normalized distance between S and R increases
for  > 0:5, and the proposed IHDAF scheme achieves
the best secrecy performance. Particularly, the IDF and the
proposed IHDAF schemes outperform the SDF scheme in
terms of achieving similar secrecy performance gain when
 < 0:2, while the proposed scheme gains more prominent
advantages when  > 0:2. This is due to the fact that when
R is close to S, the average SNR of the S-R link is high
and thus the probability of adopting AF mode in the proposed
IHDAF scheme is low, which leads to marginal benefits in the
proposed scheme relative to the IDF scheme. However, when
R is far from S, the average SNR of the S-R link is low and the
probability that the proposed scheme adopts AF mode (while
the IDF scheme fails) is high, which results in the dramatic
advantages of the proposed IHDAF scheme.
Fig. 4 plots the SOP versus SNR at E for different number of
transmit antennas at S. One can see from Fig. 4 that the SOPs
of all the schemes decrease with the SNR at E, while our
proposed IHDAF scheme achieves the best performance for

SE >  6 dB. Fig. 4 also illustrates the secrecy performance
of the proposed scheme relative to SDF and IDF schemes
becomes more prominent as the number of antennas at S
increases (i.e., from NS = 2 to NS = 4). This can be explained
by Remark 4 in Section IV.
As mentioned in Section IV-D, in Fig. 5 we numerically
examine the performance gap between the adopted sub-optimal
antenna selection and the optimal antenna selection in the
proposed scheme. Surprisingly, in this figure we observe that
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Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probability of the proposed TAS-based IHDAF scheme
with sub-optimal and optimal antenna selections, with 
SE = 
RE = 0 dB,
Re = 2 bpcu, Rc = 3:6 bpcu,  = 0:2; 0:5; 0:8,  = 1, NE = 4, ND = 2,
and NS = 2.
this gap in terms of the difference in the achieved SOP is not
significant. Specifically, this gap is negligible when 
SD is
relatively large, which is due to the fact that optimal selection
will depend more on the S-D link when the S-D link becomes
strong (e.g., the probability that the proposed scheme operates
in the DT mode is high, for which our sub-optimal selection
is optimal). Also, this gap is extremely small when  is close
to 0 or 1 (i.e., R is close to S or D). This is due to the
fact that the cooperative link (i.e., S-R-D) is weak when
one of the S-R and R-D links is weak (i.e.,  is close to
0 or 1) since the quality of the cooperative link is mainly
determined by the link of the lower quality in relay networks,
and thus the optimal selection will be mainly determined by
the S-D link. These observations confirm the validness of
the adopted sub-optimal antenna selection, which costs lower
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Fig. 6. Secrecy outage probability versus Rs for 
SE = 
RE = 0dB,

SD = 20 dB,  = 0:5;  = 1, NE = 4, ND = 2, and Re = 2 bpcu.
feedback overhead and cooperation complexity. The analysis
of the above examples show that the IDF scheme always
outperforms the SDF scheme. In the following simulations,
only the simulation results for the proposed TAS-based IHDAF
scheme, IDF and DT schemes are shown for better exposition.
Fig. 6 demonstrates the impact of the secrecy rate on the
SOPs performance of the two cooperative relaying schemes
and the DT scheme. In this figure, we observe that all the
cooperative relaying schemes achieve higher secrecy rates for
a fixed SOP. We also observe that the cooperative schemes
outperform DT scheme when Rs < 2:5bpcu in terms of
achieving lower SOPs. For a given equivocation rate (e.g.,
Re=2bpcu), the DT scheme may obtain a larger secrecy rate
at the cost of a higher SOP. We noted that if there exists a
maximum allowable SOP, the DT scheme may fail to provide
secrecy transmission while the cooperative schemes can [9].
Finally, we observe that when NS = 1, the proposed scheme
still outperforms the IDF and DT schemes, which demonstrates
that the advantage of the proposed scheme does not come from
TAS.
Fig. 7 plots the EST of different schemes versus Re. In
this figure, we first observe that the cooperative schemes
significantly outperform the DT scheme in terms of achieving
a higher EST. This is due to the fact that the relay can aid
the transmission between S and D when the DT fails, which
demonstrates the benefits of relaying protocols. In addition, we
observe that the proposed scheme can achieve a higher EST
than other schemes. Specifically, the maximum EST of the
proposed scheme is much higher than that of any other scheme,
which is due to the fact that the proposed scheme takes into
the advantages of both the AF and DF modes. Finally, we
observe that the EST gain of the proposed scheme relative to
the IDF scheme increases as the distance between S and R
increases. This observation again confirms that the proposed
scheme outperforms the IDF scheme, especially when R is
close to D.
In Fig. 8 , we compare the SOP of the proposed scheme
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Fig. 7. Effective secrecy throughput of the IHDAF, IDF and DT schemes
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RE = 0 dB, 
SD = 20 dB,  = 0:5; 0:8,  = 1, NE = 4,
ND = 2, NS = 2, and Rc = 4 bpcu.
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Fig. 8. Secrecy outage probability of the TAS-IHDAF, CB(N =4)-IHDAF,
and CB(N = 16)-IHDAF schemes with Re = 2bpcu, Rc = 3 bpcu, 
SD =
20 dB,  = 0:5;  = 1, NS = 4, ND = 1, and NE = 2.
(TAS-IHDAF) with that of the CB-IHDAF scheme. In this
figure, we first observe that the proposed TAS-IHDAF achieves
a lower SOP than the CB(N = 4)-IHDAF scheme. We note
that these two schemes require the same amount of feedback
overhead, which is dlog2 4e = 2 bits due to NS = N = 4.
As such, this observation demonstrates the advantage of the
proposed TAS-IHDAF scheme in terms of achieving a higher
secrecy performance with the same feedback overhead. Be-
sides this advantage, we note that the proposed TAS-IHDAF
only require one active RF chain while CB-IHDAF scheme
requests NS (which is 4 in this figure). As expected, we
observe that in the low regime of 
SE (e.g., < 0 dB) the
CB(N=16)-IHDAF scheme outperforms the proposed scheme
at the cost of a higher feedback overhead (i.e., CB(N = 16)-
IHDAF costs 4 bits feedback overhead while TAS-IHDAF
only requires 2 bits). However, we also observe that the
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Fig. 9. Secrecy outage probability versus the normalized distance between
S and R (i.e., ) with 
SE = 
RE = 0 dB, 
SD = 20 dB, Re = 2 bpcu,
Rc = 3:6 bpcu , ND = 2, NE = 2, and  = 0:6; 0:8; 1:
proposed TAS-IHDAF scheme achieves a lower SOP than the
CB(N = 16)-IHDAF scheme in the medium and high regimes
of 
SE (e.g.,  0 dB). This is due to the fact that in the
CB-IHDAF scheme all antennas at S are active and E can
obtain some diversity gain on average, while in the proposed
TAS-IHDAF scheme only one antenna is active (which is the
strongest one for D but random for E) and no such gain can
be achieved at E. This gain increases as the S-E link becomes
stronger (i.e., as 
SE increases), and thus once 
SE becomes
larger than some specific value the CB-IHDAF scheme loses
its benefits offered by the extra feedback overhead. This can
be confirmed by the observation in this figure that the SOPs
of the CB(N = 4)-IHDAF and CB(N = 16)-IHDAF schemes
converge together in the high regime of 
SE.
Fig. 9 plots the SOP versus the normalized distance between
S and R (i.e., the value of ) with different values of NS
and . As expected, we first observe that delayed feedback
(i.e., outdated CSI) has detrimental effect on the secrecy
performance of different schemes, and the SOPs of all the
schemes decrease as  increases. Fig. 9 shows that, when
NS = 1, the SOPs of all schemes (i.e., DT, IDF, and IHDAF
schemes) keep constant regardless of the value of . This is due
to the fact that the link of S-D is unique when NS = 1 and no
antenna selection is conducted. Fig. 9 also shows that the IDF
and IHDAF schemes achieve better secrecy performance as
NS increases, and the advantage of the IHDAF scheme relative
to the IDF scheme becomes more prominent as  increases.
In Fig. 10 , we further examine the impact of imperfect (i.e.,
outdated) CSI on the secrecy performance of the proposed
scheme. As expected, in this figure we observe that the SOPs
of all schemes increase as  decreases, since a smaller 
indicates a severer imperfect impact (e.g.,  = 0 represents
a fully outdated CSI, while  = 1 represents perfect CSI). We
also observe that with the imperfect CSI our proposed scheme
still outperforms the other schemes, which demonstrates the
robustness of the proposed scheme. This is mainly due to the
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Fig. 10. Secrecy outage probability versus SNR at D with different values of
 when NE = 4; NS = ND = 2, Re = 2 bpcu, Rc = 3:6 bpcu,  = 0:5;
and 
SE = 
RE = 0 dB.
fact that the benefits of the proposed scheme are not due to
TAS but the IHDAF strategy.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, for the first time, we propose the TAS-
based IHDAF scheme to enhance physical layer security while
maintaining low feedback overhead and hardware complexity
in a cooperative relay network. In order to fully examine the
secrecy performance of the proposed scheme, its SOP was first
derived in a closed-form expression by considering no CSI
at S. Then, asymptotic analysis on the SOP was conducted
with the SDF and IDF schemes as benchmarks, disclosing a
secrecy performance floor of the proposed TAS-based IHDAF
scheme. Furthermore, we examine the impact of the number of
antennas, relay locations, average SNRs, and secrecy rates on
the SOP of the proposed scheme. It has been shown that the
proposed TAS-based IHDAF scheme significantly outperforms
the IDF, SDF, and DT schemes in view of the a lower
SOP and a higher EST achieved, especially when R is close
to D. Furthermore, the proposed TAS-based IHDAF scheme
can outperform the CB scheme with less feedback overhead
and fewer RF chains. For future work, we will examine the
secrecy performance of IHDAF in multiple-antenna relaying
networks, where antenna selection or artificial-noise-aided
secure transmissions will be considered at the multiple-antenna
relay.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
When the S-D transmission fails in the DT mode, but R can
decode it correctly, R operates in the DF mode. According to
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the Bayes’ rule, the SOP given in (25) can be expressed as
PDFout =

Pr

CDFSRD<Rc
	
+Pr

CDFSRERe
	
Pr fCSD<Rcg
  PrCDFSRE  Re	PrCDFSRD < Rc	Pr fCSR  Rcg ;
(56)
with
PrfCSR  Rcg = 1  PrfCSR < Rcg = e 
T

SR : (57)
This is due to the fact that the TAS scheme at S is based on the
S-D link, and thus the CDF of SR as FSR(x) = (1 e 
x

SR ).
Then, the key to obtaining the PDFout is to compute PrfCDFSRD <
Rcg and PrfCDFSRE  Reg. According to [11], PrfCDFSRD < Rcg
can be expressed as
PrfCDFSRD < Rcg = Pr flog2(1 + ~SD + RD) < Rcg
= Pr f~SD + RD < Tg : (58)
Defining Y = RD, we note that Y is a sum of the squares
of ND independent Gaussian random variables, therefore, the
PDF of Y is obtained as [9]
fY (y) =
e
  y
RD yND 1
(
RD)ND  (ND)
: (59)
Using (21) and (59), we can further express (58) as
PrfCDFSRD < Rcg = Pr

~SD + RD < T
	
=
Z T
0
f ~X(~x)
 Z T ~x
0
fY (y)dy

d~x: (60)
By applying the PDFs of X and Y into (60), we obtain
(34). Following similar steps as in obtaining PrfCDFSRD < Rcg,
PrfCDFSRE  Reg can be further written as
PrfCDFSRE  Reg = 1  PrfCDFSRE < Reg
= 1  PrfSE + RE < Teg: (61)
It is important to note that the selection of the strongest
transmit antenna for D corresponds to selecting a random
transmit antenna for E. As such for E with MRC, we can
easily find that SE, RE, and RD have the same PDF and CDF.
According to these characteristics and some mathematical
manipulations, we can obtain (35), where we have calculated
the resultant integral using [33, Eq. (3.381.1))] and [33,
Eq. (3.382.1))]. Therefore, the SOP of PDFout is obtained by
substituting (31), (34), (35), and (57) into (33). This completes
the Proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
If neither D nor R has received the message from S
correctly, R operates in AF mode. Using equation (39), the
SOP can be further expressed as (62), which is shown at the
top of the next page.
Using (13), Prf(CAFSRD < Rc)j(CSD < Rc; CSR < Rc)g can
be expressed as
Prf(CAFSRD < Rc)j(CSD < Rc; CSR < Rc)g
=Prflog2(1+~SD+
SRRD
SR+RD+1
)<Rcj(1;2)g: (63)
For notational convenience, here we introduce the shorthand
1 = (CSR < Rc) and 2 = (CSD < Rc). We have
Prf log2(1 + ~SD +
SRRD
SR + RD + 1
) < Rcj1;2g (64)
' Prflog2(1 + ~SD +min(SR; RD)) < Rc j1;2g (65)
= Prf~SD + dmin < T j1;2g; (66)
with dmin = min(SR; RD), where (65) is obtained using the
approximation of S1 S2S1+S2+1 <
S1 S2
S1+S2
< min[S1; S2] [29], and
the effect of the approximation error can be neglected in high
SNR regions. In addition, this effect can also be ignored when
considering a secrecy transmission as in this paper. As shown
in Section V, our simulation results corroborate the theoretical
analysis, and the approximation is actually very accurate for
the whole SNR region.
To proceed, according to [21], the expressions of Prfdmin <
x j1g, and Pr(~SD  y j2g and their corresponding PDFs
can be obtained as in (67) and (68), which are shown at the
top of the next page. Then, we compute
Pr

~SD + 
d
min < T j1; 2
	
=
Z T
0
Z T x
0
fdmin(xj1 )f~SD(yj2 )dydx: (69)
By substituting (67) and (68) into (69), and performing
some mathematical manipulations, we can obtain (41), where
we have introduced the shorthand PAF1out = Pr f (CAFSRD <
Rc)j(CSD < Rc; CSR < Rc)g for notational convenience.
Similarly, we can obtain Prf(CAFSRE > Re)j(CSR < Rcg as
Pr f (CAFSRE  Re)jCSR < Rc) g
= Prflog2
 
1+SE+
SRRE
SE+RE+1
 Rej log2(1+SR)<Rcg
' Prflog2(1 + SE +min(SE; RE))  Re j1g
= 1  PrfSE + emin < Te j1g; (70)
with emin = min(SR; RE). Furthermore, we have
femin(xj1)
=
@
@x

Pr(eminx;1)
Pr(1)

=

REe
 x

SR  (NE;
x

RE
) + 
SRe
 x

RE ( x
RE )
NE 1[e 
x

SR   e  T
SR ]

SR
RE (NE)(1 e 
T

SR )
:
(71)
According to fSE(y) in Theorem 2 and femin(x j1 ) in (71),
PrfSE + emin < 2Re   1 j1g in (70) can be rewritten as
PrfSE + emin < Te j1g
=
Z Te
0
Z Te y
0
femin(xj1)fSE(y)dxdy: (72)
With some mathematical manipulations, and the shorthand
PAF2out = Prf(CAFSRE  Re)j(CSR < Rc)g, we can finally obtain
(42). Hence, we complete the proof of Theorem 3 .
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PAFout =
h
Prf(CAFSRD < Rc)j(CSD < Rc; CSR < Rc)g+ Prf(CAFSRE  Re)j(CSR < Rc)g
  Prf(CAFSRD < Rc)j(CSD < Rc; CSR < Rc)gPrf(CAFSRE  Re)j(CSR < Rc)g
i
PrfCSD < Rc; CSR < Rcg: (62)
fdmin(xj1) =
@
@x

Pr(dmin  x;1)
Pr(1)

=

RDe
 x

SR  (ND;
x

RD
) + 
SRe
 x

RD ( x
RD )
ND 1[e 
x

SR   e  T
SR ]

SR
RD (ND)(1  e 
T

SR )
; (67)
f~SD(yj2) =
@
@y

Pr(~SD  y;2)
Pr(2)

=
PNS 1
i=0
Pi(ND 1)
j=0
Pj
k=0  (i; j; k;
SD) e
  (i+1)y
(i(1 )+1)
SD yk+ND 1PNS 1
i=0
Pi(ND 1)
j=0
Pj
k=0  (i; j; k;
SD)
 1

k+ND;
(i+1)T
(i(1 )+1)
SD


(i+1)
(i(1 )+1)
SD
k+ND
: (68)
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